Publications des chercheurs de PSE

Ce papier traite de la question de la valeur, en termes de bien-être, des bonnes relations entre pays, par le biais de l'analyse d'un groupe d'individus liés aux deux pays : les immigrés. Nous faisons appel à un indice de conflit et coopération calculé comme une somme pondérée du nombre de communiqués de presse entre deux pays. Cet indice est ensuite apparié à un échantillon d'immigrés en Allemagne dans les données du SOEP. Notre mesure des relations bilatérales varie donc non seulement dans le temps mais aussi entre immigrés venant de pays différents. Nous observons une relation positive et significative entre la satisfaction dans la vie des immigrés et la qualité des relations bilatérales entre le pays d'accueil et le pays d'origine. Cet effet est plus marqué pour les immigrés présents en Allemagne depuis plus longtemps et qui veulent y rester. Ce résultat témoigne de l'effet direct des relations internationales sur la qualité de la vie quotidienne des immigrés dans le pays d'accueil, un effet qui semble contradictoire avec l'hypothèse assimilation. L'effet de la diplomatie sur le bien-être est donc positive.

We study the determinants of international cooperation and its effect on trade. We rely on a unique database of 31,982 International Cooperation Agreements (ICAs) signed between 1945-2022 by 193 countries. Estimating bilateral gravity equations, we find that trade follows the flag: ICAs increase bilateral exports by around 1-3%, with stronger effects for South-South relations. We address potential endogeneity through panel approach and an instrumental variable that exploits the network structure of international relations. Further, using LPM we find that gravity forces explain country pairs entering an ICA. Importantly, we find that ICAs serve as stepping stones towards Regional Trade Agreements, confirming a previous step in Balassa (1961) theory of economic integration. Our results shed new light on the international relations-trade nexus and contribute to the current debate on friendshoring.

This paper investigates the effect of the implementation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on the bilateral stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI). We argue that the understanding of how BITs affect FDI requires recognising that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are not Stateless and that their investment return may well depend on the quality of political relations between the home and host countries. Using bilateral FDI data and event data to measure political interactions between countries, we show that the effect of the entry into force of a BIT crucially depends on the quality of political relations between the signatory countries; it increases FDI more between countries with tense relationships than between friendly countries. We also find evidence that BITs and good domestic institutions are complementary. BITs should therefore be understood as a mechanism for host governments to credibly commit not to expropriate investors in the future.

Tough anti-terrorism policies are often defended by focusing on a fixed minority of the population who prefer violent outcomes, and arguing that toughness reduces the risk of terrorism from this group. This reasoning implicitly assumes that tough policies do not increase the group of 'potential terrorists', i.e., of people with violent preferences. Preferences and their level of violence are treated as stable, exogenously fixed features. To avoid this unrealistic assumption, I formulate a model in which policies can 'brutalise' or 'appease' someone's personality, i.e., his preferences. This follows the endogenous preferences approach, popular elsewhere in political science and economics. I formally decompose the effect of toughness into a (desirable) deterrence effect and an (undesirable) provocation effect. Whether toughness is overall efficient depends on which effect overweighs. I show that neglecting provocation typically leads to toughness exaggeration. This suggests that some tough anti-terrorism policies observable in the present and past can be explained by a neglect of provocation.