Tobias Broer

We document two stylized facts in expectational data. First, professional forecasters overrevise their macroeconomic expectations. Second, such overrevisions mask evidence of both over- and underreactions to public signals. We show that the first fact is inconsistent with standard models of noisy rational expectations, but consistent with behavioral and strategic models. The second fact, in contrast, presents a puzzle for existing theories. We propose an extension of noisy rational expectations that allows forecasters to be overconfident in their information. We show that this feature when combined with the endogeneity of public signals leads to over- and undereactions consistent with the data.

We use an analytically tractable heterogeneous‐agent (HANK) version of the standard New Keynesian model to show how the size of fiscal multipliers depends on (i) the distribution of factor incomes, and (ii) the source of nominal rigidities. With sticky prices but flexible wages, the standard representative‐agent (RANK) model predicts large multipliers because profits fall after a fiscal stimulus and the resulting negative income effect makes the representative worker work harder. Our HANK model, where workers do not own stock, and thus do not receive profit income, predicts smaller fiscal multipliers. In fact, they are smaller with sticky prices than with flexible prices. When wages are the source of nominal rigidity, in contrast, fiscal multipliers are close to one, independently of income heterogeneity and price stickiness.

We adapt the wage contracting structure in Chari (1983) to a dynamic, balanced-growth setting with recontracting as in Calvo (1983). The resulting wage-rigidity framework dampens income effects in the short run, thus allowing significant responses of hours to aggregate shocks. In reduced form, the model dynamics are similar to that in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), with their habit parameter replaced by our probability of wage-contract resetting. That is, if wage contracts are reset frequently, labor supply behaves in accordance with King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) preferences, whereas if they are never reset, we obtain the setting in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988).

Solutions to macroeconomic models with wealth inequality and aggregate shocks often rely on the assumption of limited but common information among households. We show that this assumption is inconsistent with rational information choice for plausible information costs. To do so, we embed information choice into the workhorse heterogeneous-agent model with aggregate risk (Krusell and Smith, 1998). First, we demonstrate that the benefits of acquiring more precise information about the state of the economy depend crucially on household wealth. Second, we show that such heterogeneous incentives to acquire information combine with the strategic substitutability of savings choices to imply that equilibria in which households acquire the same information do not exist for plausible information costs. Finally, we document that a representative-agent equilibrium may not exist even in the absence of exogenous sources of wealth heterogeneity.

We quantitatively evaluate a model of insurance with limited commitment where the requirement that contracts be immune to deviations by subcoalitions makes group size endogenous, as proposed by Genicot and Ray. We compare the model’s predictions to panel data from rural Indian villages. Apart from predicting a realistic degree of insurance, the model captures the evidence along two new dimensions: First, the largest coalition-proof groups are substantially smaller than typical villages. Second, with strong insurance in small groups, individual consumption responds symmetrically to income rises and falls, while alternative models predict strong counterfactual asymmetry.

Survey respondents disagree strongly about the dispersion of future returns and, increasingly, macroeconomic uncertainty. Such disagreement about risk may raise asset prices when collateralized debt products allow investors to realize perceived gains from trade. Investors who expect low volatility in collateral cash-flow appreciate senior debt as riskless. Those who expect high volatility, in contrast, value the upside potential in junior debt or equity claims. We show how such self-selection may have had a sizeable effect on the prices of RMBS and CDOs before the crisis, as investors disagreed about the volatility of aggregate economic conditions and their importance for default rates in collateral pools.